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Gay: Tort of Insurer's Bad Faith Refusal to Pay First-Party Claims

TORT OF INSURER'S BAD FAITH REFUSAL
TO PAY FIRST-PARTY CLAIMS
Double-digit inflation has sent the cost of living skyrocketing
in recent years, making insurance coverage a basic necessity of
modern life to guard against financial ruin. The death or permanent disability of a breadwinner, a lengthy hospital stay, or loss of
a home or business in a catastrophe can bankrupt an individual or
business entity lacking insurance protection. Anxiety about the
financial consequences of such occurrences motivates the
purchase of insurance against the perils attending everyday life.
When an individual buys an insurance policy, he or she does
so with the expectation that the insurer will indemnify him or her
against losses resulting from the covered risks.1 From the purchaser's viewpoint, he or she is not merely entering into a contract
for the future payment of money upon the happening of certain
contingencies; he or she is purchasing security and peace of
mind. 2 Insurance companies employ marketing techniques aimed
at presenting them "not as for-profit industries selling money, but
as benevolent corporations selling freedom from care."' In its advertisements, for example, the insurer may promise its policyholder to "simplify his life," to place him "in good hands," to
provide him with "a piece of the rock," or to be "on his side."
These slogans foster the insured's expectation that his insurance
company will stand behind him in his hour of need.'
While most insurers pay legitimate claims of their policyholders in a timely fashion, in many jurisdictions the state of the law
actually encourages insurance companies to deny claims or delay
paying policy benefits intentionally or unreasonably. If the insured brings a court action because of the insurer's wrongdoing, a
number of states will limit his or her recovery to the amount of
payments due under the policy plus interest for breach of the in-

' First-party insurance claims, as distinguished from third-party claims, are
the subject of this note. First-party insurance indemnifies the policyholder for his
own losses (life, health, accident, fire, and casualty), whereas third-party coverage
protects the insured against liability claims by others.
Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 404, 89 Cal.
Rptr. 78, 95 (1970).
Comment, 30 ME. L. REv. 308, 319 (1979).
D'Ambrosio v. Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 396 A.2d 780, 786 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1978).
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surance contract.5 This remedy is often inadequate to compensate
the policyholder for the detriment he or she may suffer as a result
of the insurance company's unjust refusal to pay him or her the
benefits due. By severely restricting the amount of damages recoverable, the legal system patently fails in its efforts to make the
wronged policyholder whole again.
Under this state of the law, an insurance company can maximize its profits by denying or delaying payment of its insured's
valid claim. The insurer is then free to invest monies rightfully
due its policyholder at interest rates double the current rate of
legal interest' and to earn additional profits at the expense of its
insured. By playing a "waiting game" with a policyholder who is
in dire financial straits following an insured loss, the insurer may
coerce the policyholder into settling for less than the full benefits
due him or her. Even if the insured brings a suit and obtains a
judgment, the defendant insurer will have to pay only the policy
amount due plus low legal interest.
A more suitable remedy is needed when an insurance company unjustifiably denies its policyholder's claim, both to compensate the insured for the total detriment he or she suffers as a
result of the insurer's misconduct and to deter similar wrongdoing
in the future. Courts in some states provide such a remedy by
allowing a policyholder to recover consequential damages in a
contract action against an insurer which breaches the terms of the
policy. Other jurisdictions recognize a breach of duty by the insurance company, based on tort theories of fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and bad faith. Legislatures in various
states have enacted statutes permitting the insured to recover attorneys' fees and/or penalties against his or her insurer for denying or delaying payment of a valid claim.
Of all remedies available for an insurance company's refusal
to honor a legitimate claim, recognition of the tort of bad faith
best conforms to the "economic, social and legal realities of the

' 16 J. AppEm & J. AmmzmmN,INsuRNcE LAW AND PRAcTcE § 8881, at 634
(1968). See, e.g., Dawkins v. Nat'l Liberty Life Ins. Co., 252 F. Supp. 800 (D.S.C.
1966); Meridian Mut. Ins. Co. v. McMullen, 152 Ind. App. 141, 282 N.E.2d 558
(1972).
1 Legal interest in West Virginia, for example, is currently 6%. W.VA. CODE §
47-6-5 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
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problem."' The theory underlying this cause of action is that the
insurer owes to its insured a duty of good faith and fair dealing
arising under a statute or from an implied covenant in the insurance contract. For violation of this duty, a policyholder may recover compensatory damages, including damages for mental distress. In a proper case this cause of action also permits recovery of
punitive or exemplary damages.
I. LEGAL RELATIONSHIP OF INSURER AND INSURED
Insurance is a modem society's response to risk allocation.
Beginning in the late nineteenth century when the industry became firmly established in the United States, the insurance business' role as an indemnifier against the risks of loss led to widespread investment fostering the economic growth of this nation.
During the early years of the industry, courts declined to regulate
insurance companies extensively in order to encourage their development. This laxity of the courts, coupled with an increasing demand and necessity for insurance and the growing financial resources of insurance companies, aided insurers in attaining a
superior bargaining position over those seeking insurance
protection.'
The industry's increasing clout prompted the United States
Supreme Court in 1914 to recognize in German Alliance Insurance
Co. v. Lewis9 that the business of insurance is "clothed with a
public interest."'" Therefore, the industry itself and the methods
by which it does business are properly subject to strict state regulation. The duty of an insurance company to its insured is not
that which arises in the usual commercial contract. Instead, this
duty arises from a form of public trust, where large sums are deposited, with the right in the insured to demand and receive services when a certain contingency occurs."
Since German Alliance, numerous state courts have recogFletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 402, 89 Cal.

See text accompanying note 93 infra.
8 Hirsch & Carpenter, Strict Liability: A Response to the Gruenberg-Silberg
Conflict Regarding Insurance Litigation Awards, 7 Sw. U.L. REV. 310, 310 (1975)
Rptr. 78, 94 (1970).

[hereinafter cited as Hirsch & Carpenter].
233 U.S. 389 (1914).
Id. at 415.
" Id. at 406-07 (by implication).
"
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nized the quasi-public nature of the insurance industry, 2 as well
as the adhesive nature of an insurance contract. 3 Insurance policies are standardized, mass-produced form contracts, the terms of
which are dictated either by the insurer or, as in the case of a fire
insurance policy, by the state legislature." This fact has led virtually every jurisdiction to adopt the rule, applicable to all types of
insurance policies, that ambiguous terms in an insurance contract
are to be construed strictly against the insurer and liberally in
favor of the insured. 5 Courts also construe exclusionary language
in insurance policies according to this rule.
The adhesive nature of an insurance contract is one element
of the special relationship that exists between an insurer and its
insured. There are two additional aspects of this relationship: the
state's extensive regulation of the insurance industry and the insured's reliance on the insurer's credibility. In purchasing insurance the policyholder reasonably relies on the expectation that his
or her insurance company, with its vast economic resources, will
provide him or her financial protection and emotional security
against the risk of accidental loss. The insurer's opportunity for
overreaching in this situation may create a fiduciary relationship
between the contracting parties."
This fiduciary concept has gained wide acceptance in the
context of third-party (liability) insurance claims, with courts in a
number of states adopting the view that an insurer owes a duty of
due care 7 or good faith and fair dealing" to its liability insurance
12 See, e.g., Johnson v. Continental Cas. Co., 201 S.E.2d
13 R. KEETON, BASIc TEXT ON INSUIANCE LAw § 2.10(b) at

292 (W. Va. 1973).

73 (1971). Adhesion

contracts have been described in Ehrenzweig, Adhesion Contracts in the Conflict
of Laws, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 1072, 1075 (1953), as "agreements in which one party's
participation consists in his mere 'adherence,' unwilling and often unknowing, to a
document drafted unilaterally and insisted upon by what is usually a powerful
enterprise." Examples are insurance policies, commercial loan contracts, transportation contracts, and employment contracts.
" See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 33-17-2 (1975 Replacement Vol.).
"See, e.g., Bryan v. Peabody Ins. Co., 8 W. Va. 605 (1875).
" Comment, 13 TuiSA L.J. 605, 613-15 (1978).
'7 See, e.g., Anderson v. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 340 F.2d 406 (7th Cir.
1965) (applying Indiana law); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 280 Ala. 343,
194 So. 2d 505 (1967); Tri-State Ins. Co. v. Busby, 251 Ark. 568, 473 S.W.2d 893
(1971), allowing the insured to bring an action for an insurer's negligence, fraud, or
bad faith in settling third-party claims.
Is See, e.g., General Accident Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v. Little, 103 Ariz. 435,
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policyholder in settling third-party claims against its insured
within the limits of policy coverage. In cases where the insurer's
breach of this duty results in the third party winning a judgment
against the insured for an amount in excess of policy limits, rany
courts hold the insurer liable for the full amount of the judgment.
The rationale for charging the insurance company with this excess
liability is that it stands in a true fiduciary relationship to its liability policyholder against whom a claim has been made.
While many courts have recognized this good faith duty in
regard to third-party insurance claims, a number have refused to
do so in the first-party insurance context on the ground that no
fiduciary relationship exists between the insurer and its own insured who is seeking policy benefits.'9 However, this distinction
between third- and first-party insurance claims is more legalistic
than realistic. "In both cases the insurer has contracted to protect
the insured against loss. In both cases it has control over the settlement of claims. It should be liable for all loss resulting from its
bad faith, whether the loss to the insured occurs from legal liability or otherwise."'"
II.

REMEDIES FOR AN INSURER'S WRONGFUL REFUSAL TO PAY

FiRsT-PARTY CLAIMs
In jurisdictions which have yet to recognize an insurer's duty
of good faith and fair dealing in handling claims made by its insured, the policyholder may bring either a contract action or another type of tort suit against an insurer who wrongfully denies or
delays paying a first-party claim. The insured's burden of proving
his or her insurer's misconduct varies greatly in these causes of
action, as do the damages the policyholder can recover against the
insurer if his or her suit is successful.

443 P.2d 690 (1968); Manchester Ins. & Indem. Co. v. Grundy, 531 S.W.2d 493
(Ky. 1975); Strand v. Travelers Ins. Co., 300 Minn. 311, 219 N.W.2d 622 (1974).
"In Baxter v. Royal Indem. Co., 285 So. 2d 652 (Fla. App. 1973), for example, the court refused to apply the duty of good faith and fair dealing to first-party
claims on the ground that here the relationship between the insurer and its insured is adversarial, rather than fiduciary, in nature.
1*Note, The Availability of Excess Damages for Wrongful Refusal to Honor
FirstParty Insurance Claims -An Emerging Trend, 45 FORDHAM L. Rav. 164, 178
n.99 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Note, FonnHAm L. REV.].
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Statutory Remedies

All aspects of the insurance industry are heavily regulated by
legislation, and several types of statutes figure prominently in
some states when an insurer denies or delays payment of a firstparty claim. These include acts specifying damages for breach of
an insurance contract 2' allowing interest to accrue on overdue insurance benefits,22 prohibiting unfair claims practices, 2 and limiting awards of punitive damages in court actions.2 ' Of even greater
importance in this context are statutes requiring insurers to pay
benefits promptly2 and those awarding attorneys' fees and/or penalties in a policyholder's action to recover payments due from an
insurance company.26
In a few jurisdictions with statutes requiring insurance companies to pay claims promptly or immediately upon receipt of
proper proof of loss, courts have recognized a legal duty owed by
the insurer to its insured apart from their mutual obligations
under the insurance contract. The insurer's bad faith breach of
21 See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 22 (West 1955), construed in Christian
v. American Home Assur. Co., 577 P.2d 899 (Okla. 1978), not to limit the plaintiff's recovery in a tort action for the insurer's bad faith, as opposed to an action
for breach of the insurance contract.
n See, e.g., HAWAI REV. STAT. § 431-455.5 (Cum. Supp. 1978); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 74, § 2 (Smith-Hurd 1966); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 65B.54 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
2' See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03 (Deering Supp. 1979); COLO. REV. STAT.
49 10-3-1101 to -1112 (1973); OR. REV. STAT. § 746.230 (1977); S.D. COLED LAWS
ANN. §§ 58-33-1 to -58 (1978); W. VA. CODE §§ 33-11-1 to -10 (1975 Replacement

Vol.).
?A See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (Deering 1972), construed in Richardson v.
Employers Liability Assur. Corp., 25 Cal. App. 3d 232, 102 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1972),
to allow punitive damages for an insurer's malicious and oppressive failure to act
in good faith; MoN. REV. CODES ANN. § 17-208 (1961) [now MONT. CODE ANN. §
27-1-221], construed in First Sec. Bank of Bozeman v. Goddard, 593 P.2d 1040
(Mont. 1979), to permit the plaintiff-insured to recover punitive damages where
the defendant-insurer's conduct is unjustifiable and constitutes "malice-in.law";
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 9 (West 1955), construed in Christian v. American
Home Assur. Co., 577 P.2d 899 (Okla. 1978), not to preclude recovery of punitive
damages in a bad faith tort cause of action.
25 See, e.g., MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 40-4213 (1961) [now MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 33-21-105]; OKA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 4405(A)(8) (1976).
28 See statutes cited notes 29 and 30 infra.
2 First Sec. Bank of Bozeman v. Goddard, 593 P.2d 1040 (Mont. 1979), construing MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 40-4213 (1961) [now MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-21105]; Christian v. American Home Assur. Co., 577 P.2d 899 (Okla. 1978), construing OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 4405(A)(8) (1976).
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this statutory duty will permit the insured to recover damages in
a tort suit for all detriment proximately caused by the insurer's
failure to pay the claim in a timely manner.2s This is a greater
measure of damages than that generally recoverable in a contract
action.
Other states have enacted statutes permitting the insured to
recover reasonable attorneys' fees 29 and/or penalties" in an action
against an insurer which delays or denies payment of a legitimate
claim. These statutory provisions fall into three categories. In the
first category are statutes proscribing the insurer's failure to pay
benefits within a certain period of time, ranging from a minimum
of thirty days31 to a maximum of six months. 2 The second cate25593 P.2d at 1047, applying MONT. REv. CODrs ANN. § 17-401 (1961) [now
MoNr. CODE ANN. § 27-1-317], which permits recovery "for all the detriment proximately caused thereby whether it could be anticipated or not."
29See, e.g., DiL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 4102 (1974); FA. STAT. ANN. § 627.428
(West 1972), repealed by 1976 Fla. Laws ch. 76-168, § 3, effective July 1, 1982;
HAWAn Rnv. STAT. § 431-455 (1976 Replacement Vol.); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-359
(1978); N.H. Rnv. STAT. ANN. § 491:22-b (Cum. Supp. 1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 621.1 (Cum. Supp. 1979) (provides counsel fees where the judgment against the
insurer is $5,000 or less); S.D. ComnED LAws ANN. § 58-12-3 (1978). In some
states these attorneys' fee statutes are applicable only in actions against unauthorized insurers or unauthorized foreign or alien insurers. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT.
§ 10-3-1005 (1973); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26-09-15 (1978 Replacement Vol.); W. VA.
CODE § 33-4-13(d) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
N See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-3238 (1966 Replacement Vol.); GA. CODE
ANN. § 56-1206 (1977); Imr. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, § 767 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:658 (West 1978); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 375.420 (Vernon Supp.
1980). Logically, jurisdictions which have adopted statutory no-fault automobile
insurance, thus abolishing the common law tort system in part, should also enact
statutes providing substantial penalties for an insurance company's failure to pay
a valid claim promptly. MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 175, § 113 0 (Michie/Law. Co-op
1977), for example, provides that if the insurer has not paid a claim within seven
days after receiving its insured's completed claim forms, the policyholder may
commence a civil action for payments he or she claims to be due. The claimant is
entitled to recover double the amount of damage plus court costs and reasonable
attorneys' fees.
11Idaho Code § 41-1839 (1977); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22:657 (West 1978)
(applicable to health and accident insurance, except accidental death coverage);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 375.420 (Vernon Supp. 1980); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 1219
(1976); TExAS INs. CODE art. 3.62 (Vernon 1963). See Keintz & Mann, Extra-Contract Damages for Breach of Insurance Contracts: The Statutory Approach, 660
INs. L.J. 7 (1978) for an analysis of the penalty and attorneys' fee statutes of 14
states.
3 On. REv. STAT. § 743.114 (1977).
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gory includes statutes permitting recovery of attorneys' fees or
penalties if the insurer fails to pay the claim within a specified
time period and fails to behave in a certain manner. The third
category consists of statutes not including an' specified time period for payment but imposing sanctions for the insurer's unjustified refusal to pay a claim. These acts provide penalties ranging
3 to twenty-five
from ten percent1
percent"' of the insurer's liability
under the policy.
Language describing the nature of the insurer's misconduct
triggering an award of attorneys' fees or penalties varies among
statutes in the second and third categories. Statutes in several jurisdictions incorporate a bad faith standard,35 while other states'
acts authorize the insured's recovery of attorneys' fees or penalties
when the insurer's refusal to pay a claim is "vexatious and unreasonable," 3 "arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause,"', or
"without just cause or excuse."38
Courts in the majority of states having such attorneys' fee
and penalty statutes hold that these laws are penal in nature and
must be strictly construed." These jurisdictions limit the insured's recovery against a recalcitrant insurer to the policy
amount, the statutory penalties, and attorneys' fees when an insured brings an action on a theory of bad faith.'0 Only a few states
hold that such attorneys' fee statutes should be liberally conMo.

ANN.STAT.
GA. CODE Am.

§ 375.420 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
§ 56-1206 (1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-1105A (1968 Re-

placement Vol.).
" GA. CODE ANN. §§ 56-407.1(j), 56-1206 (1977) (penalty statutes); S.C. CODE
§ 38.9-320 (1976) (attorneys' fee statute); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-1105A (1968 Replacement Vol.) (pepalty statute).
u8IL.ANN. STAT. ch. 73, § 767 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979). N.D. CENT. CODE §
26-09-15 (1978 Replacement Vol.) contains similar language.
3' LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:658 (West 1978).
3 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 375.420 (Vernon Supp. 1980). KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-256
(1973) contains similar language.
" See, e.g., Callum v. Farmers Union Mut. Ins. Co., 256 Ark. 376, 508 S.W.2d
316 (1974); Interstate Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Hopgood, 133 Ga. App. 6, 209 S.E.2d
703 (1974); Headrick v. Pennsylvania Millers Mut. Ins. Co., 257 La. 1101, 245 So.
2d 324 (1971); Fohn v. Title Ins. Corp. of St. Louis, 529 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1975); Int'l
Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Redwine, 481 S.W.2d 792 (Tex. 1972).
40 See, e.g., Tate v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 149 Ga. App. 123, 253 S.E.2d 775
(1979); Lord v. State Auto. & Cas. Underwriters, 208 Kan. 227, 491 P.2d 917
(1971); Housing Auth. v. Baumann, 512 S.W.2d 436 (Mo. App. 1974); Ranger Ins.
Co. v. Macy, 88 S.D. 674, 227 N.W.2d 426 (1975).
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strued, as they are remedial in nature."
As an alternative to a tort recovery for damages arising out of
the bad faith dealings of an insurance company, attorneys' fee
and penalty statutes are intrinsically inadequate. They are aimed
at penalizing the insurer for its wrongdoing, not at fully compensating the insured for his or her detriment. Inmany cases the penalties afforded by these statutes will fall far short of compensating
the policyholder for his or her pecuniary loss and mental suffering
resulting from the insurer's failure to pay his or her claim. These
statutes usurp the function of the jury in determining the damage
award due the injured policyholder.
B.

Contract Liability

An insurance policy is a contract and is to be governed by the
same principles that control other contracts." Absent penalty
statutes permitting greater recovery against an insurer for refusal
to pay or settle claims, two cases decided in the nineteenth century, New Orleans Insurance Co. v. Piaggio"3 and Hadley v. Baxendale," still control the amount of damages recoverable for
breach of contract in most jurisdictions.
In the 1872 case of New Orleans Insurance, the United States
Supreme Court held that in an action on an insurance contract
the plaintiff's recovery is limited to the amount due under the
terms of the policy plus legal interest. 5 Some states retain this
rule today as the measure of damages for a breach of contract to
pay money,"8 such as an insurance policy.
A slightly more liberal measure of damages is provided by the
rule in Hadley v. Baxendale, in which'the English court held that
in contract law, damages recoverable for breach are limited to
11Hubbard v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 24 N.C. App. 493, 211 S.E.2d 544,
cert. denied, 286 N.C. 723, 213 S.E.2d 721 (1975); Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v.

Farmers Ins. Exch., 256 Or. 599, 474 P.2d 316 (1970).
41Douglas v. Koontz, 137 W. Va. 345, 71 S.E.2d 319 (1952); Croft v. Hanover
Fire Ins. Co., 40 W. Va. 508, 21 S.E. 854 (1895).

83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 378 (1872).
"9 Exch. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 386-87.
"See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 3302 (Deering 1972); Abbey v. Farmers Ins.
Exch., 281 Minn. 113, 160 N.W.2d 709 (1968); Evans v. Pacific Nat'l Fire Ins. Co.,
367 S.W.2d 85 (Tex. Civ. Ct. App. 1963).
"
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those reasonably within the contemplation of the parties at the
time the contract is entered.47 Various states adopt the Hadley
approach in combination with other standards for determining
recoverability of consequential damages in a contract action.4 8
One difficulty clearly exists with a measure of damages based
on the foreseeability of consequences arising from an insurer's refusal to pay first-party claims. The purchaser's only reason for obtaining an insurance policy is to guard against unpredictablerisks
and their consequences. However, the inability of a disabled policyholder to meet mortgage obligations or the subsequent bankruptcy of an insured whose family-owned business has burned
may not be held "foreseeable" or "within the contemplation of
both parties at the time of contracting" if the insurance companies in these situations refuse to pay claims. On the other hand, it
is arguable that these are foreseeable consequences of the insurer's
4
denial of valid claims.
In addition, a policyholder who loses his or her mortgaged
home or goes bankrupt due to an insurance company's wrongful
refusal to honor his or her valid claim will understandably suffer
mental anguish as a result. However, the insured who pursues a
breach of contract action against an insurer will generally be precluded from recovering damages for emotional distress. Many
courts will award such damages only when the purpose of the contract, either by its provisions or within the parties' reasonable
contemplation, "concerns or directly provides for the comfort,
happiness or personal esteem of one of the parties."5
109 Exch. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
" The New York court held, for example, in Gordon v. Nationwide Mut. Ins.
Co., 30 N.Y.2d 427, 285 N.E.2d 849, 334 N.Y.S.2d 601 (1972), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 931 (1973), that the policyholder could recover damages for all detriment
proximately caused by the insurer's breach of contract.
" Reichert v. Gen. Ins. Co. of America, 428 P.2d 860, 868, 59 Cal. Rptr. 724,
732 (1967), vacated, 68 Cal. 2d 822, 442 P.2d 377, 69 Cal. Rptr. 321 (1968).
-4 Parks, Recovery of Extra.ContractDamagesin Suits on InsurancePolicies,
9 FORUM 43, 58 (1973). In actions on contracts of common carriers, contracts for
the disposition of corpses, and contracts for delivery of death messages, where the
defendant has reason to know when the contract is entered that its breach will
cause the plaintiff mental suffering for reasons other than financial loss, damages
for mental anguish may be recovered. See Note, Damages for Mental Suffering
Caused by Insurers: Recent Developments in the Law of Tort and Contract, 48
NrE DAME LAw. 1303 (1973).
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The California court was among the first to consider an insurance contract to be "personal" rather than commercial, thus allowing recovery of damages for mental suffering in a contract action on an insurance policy.' 1 Michigan also permits recovery of
damages for emotional distress if the policy sued upon in the contract action involves "matters of mental concern or solicitude,"
such as a life insurance or disability policy. 2 However, these
states are among a small minority of jurisdictions which award
damages for mental suffering in suits against insurers for breach
of contract.
Punitive or exemplary damages are also generally not recoverable in a contract action. The rationale for this rule stems from
the distinction between compensation and punishment.
If the general purpose underlying the law of damages is to promote security and prevent disorder, . . . and breaches of con-

tract do not cause as much resentment or other physical or
mental discomfort as do wrongs called torts or crimes, then the
remedies needed to prevent breaches of contract and satisfy
the injured party are not as severe as those needed to punish
the tort feasor or criminal.n
In a contract action to recover payments due under an insurance policy, the West Virginia court traditionally limited the
damages recoverable to the benefits specified in the contract plus
interest." However, recent case law supports the view that the insured could also recover additional compensatory damages incurred as a result of the insurer's breaching its contractual obligations to him or her. Such damages would be limited to those that
may fairly and reasonably be considered as arising naturally
-that is, according to the usual course of things-from the
breach of the contract itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties at the
I Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 434, 426 P.2d 173, 179, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 13, 19 (1967).
12Seaton v. State Farm Life Ins. Co., 75 Mich. App. 252, 260, 254 N.W.2d

858, 862 (1977) (life insurance policy); Kewin v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
79 Mich. App. 639, 650, 263 N.W.2d 258, 263 (1977) (disability insurance policy).

51Ledingham v. Blue Cross Plan for Hosp. Care, 29 Ill. App. 3d 339, 344, 330
N.E.2d 540, 544 (1975), rev'd on othergrounds, 64 Ill. 2d 338, 356 N.E.2d 75 (1976)

(paraphrasing 5 A. CoRsiN, CoNRAcrs § 1077 at 437-38 (1964)).
"See, e.g., Rubenstein v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 118 W. Va. 367, 190
S.E. 531 (1937).
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time they made the contract, as the probable result of its
breach."
Nevertheless, application of this rule will generally prevent an
award of damages for mental suffering, and punitive damages are
also not recoverable in a breach of contract action in West
Virginia. 6
An insurer's breach of contract by intentional and unreasonable refusal to honor the valid claim of a policyholder often
amounts to tortious conduct. Such a refusal may be in bad faith,
willful, or in reckless disregard of the insured's rights. Punitive
damages should be awarded in such a case to punish the insurance company for its wrongdoing and to serve as an example for
others in the insurance industry that such conduct, which is deleterious to society, will not be tolerated. Therefore, because the injured policyholder can rarely recover exemplary damages against
an insurer, a contract remedy is inadequate.
C.

Tort Theories of Recovery

Fraud
The elements of fraud are: (1) a misrepresentation or concealment by the defendant (2) made with knowledge of its falsity (3)
with intent to defraud the plaintiff, upon which the plaintiff (4)
justifiably relied to (5) his detriment." Fraud arises in two forms
in the insurance context: fraud at the time the policy is issued (or
fraud in the inducement to purchase the insurance) and fraudulent conduct in settling a claim (or fraudulent breach of the insurance contract) .S
The difficulty with fraud actions, proof of fraudulent intent,
is most evident in jurisdictions which require the policyholder to
prove fraud in the inducement to enter the insurance contract.
The insurer's intent not to pay does not usually become apparent
until the insured files a claim. In many states, however, proof of

I Kentucky Fried Chicken of Morgantown, Inc. v. Sellaro, 214 S.E.2d 823,
827 (W. Va. 1975) (quoting 22 Am. JuR. 2D Damages § 56 (1965)).
" See, e.g., Short v. Grange Mut. Cas. Co., 307 F. Supp. 768 (S.D. W. Va.
1969).
" W. PRossER, THE LAw OF Tors § 105 at 685-86 (4th ed. 1971).

mMann & Keitz, Judicial Approaches to the Awarding of Extra-Contract
Damages for Breach of Insurance Contracts, 661 INs. L.J. 95, 100-01 (1978).
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fraudulent intent at that stage is not adequate to support an allegation of fraud in the inducement and to permit recovery of
damages. 9
California's lower appellate courts have eased the plaintiff's
burden in this regard. These courts have allowed the insurer's intent not to perform the contract to be inferred from its subsequent
refusal to pay benefits to which the insured was entitled under a
disability policy."0 California's lower courts have also permitted
recovery of punitive damages for fraud based entirely on the insurer's promise contained in the insurance policy to make payments if the insured becomes disabled.61
A West Virginia policyholder may seek redress against an insurer which wrongfully refuses to pay his first-party claim by
bringing suit for fraud. 2 Damages recoverable in such an action
include those for mental suffering and punitive damages in the
proper case.
In pursuing this cause of action the insured need not prove
fraud in the inducement to purchase the insurance policy, or "actual fraud." The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has defined actual fraud as "deception, intentionally practiced, to induce another to part with property or to surrender some legal
right, and which accomplishes the end designed." 3
Instead the plaintiff-insured may recover in a fraud action
against an insurer which wrongfully refuses to pay a valid claim
at any time after ihe insurance contract is entered. Such conduct
by the insurer would constitute "constructive fraud," defined by
the West Virginia court as "a breach of legal or equitable duty,
which, irrespective of moral guilt of the fraud feasor, the law declares fraudulent, because of its tendency to deceive others, to violate public or private confidence, or to injure public interests."'"

5' Note, FoRoHAm L. REv., supra note 20, at 171.
Wetherbee v. United Ins. Co. of America, 265 Cal. App. 2d 921, 71 Cal.

Rptr. 764 (1968).
It Miller v. Nat'l American Life Ins. Co., 54 Cal. App. 3d 331, 126 Cal. Rptr.
731 (1976).
11See generally Steele v. Steele, 295 F. Supp. 1266 (S.D. W. Va. 1969); Miller
v. Huntington & Ohio Bridge Co., 123 W. Va. 320, 15 S.E.2d 687 (1941).
a Miller v. Huntington & Ohio Bridge Co., 123 W. Va. at 334, 15 S.E. 2d at
695 (quoting Moore v. Gregory, 146 Va. 504, 131 S.E. 692 (1925)).

" Id.
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The West Virginia insured's ability to recover damages
against an insurance company for constructive fraud places upon
him or her a considerably lighter burden of proof than plaintiffs in
many other jurisdictions face when bringing a fraud action. Nonetheless, a presumption always exists in this state in favor of the
defendant's innocence and honesty in a given transaction. The
burden is on the plaintiff who alleges fraud to prove it by clear
65
and distinct evidence.
Allowing the insured to recover for the insurer's fraudulent
conduct in settling a claim is equivalent to the cause of action
authorized in several jurisdictions for fraudulent breach of contract." The South Carolina court, for example, has shown great
sensitivity toward insurer misconduct in cases decided on this
theory, evidencing a tendency to construe any misbehavior as a
"fraudulent act.

'6 7

A cause of action for fraudulent breach of an insurance policy
is a more logical and adequate theory of rdcovery than fraud in
the inducement to enter the contract, which may be nearly impossible to prove. The theory of fraudulent breach of contract bases
the policyholder's recovery directly on the insurer's wrongdoing
which caused the insured's detriment-improper refusal to pay a
valid claim. Additionally, this theory permits recovery for all
damages proximately caused by the insurance company's misconduct. 8 However, only a small number of jurisdictions recognize
the independent tort of fraudulent breach of contract, possibly because they are unwilling to adopt a cause of action which blurs
the distinction between contract and tort.

Hunt v. Hunt, 91 W. Va. 685, 114 S.E. 283 (1922).
" See, e.g., Physicians Mut. Ins. Co. v. Savage, 156 Ind. App. 283, 296 N.E.2d
165 (1973); Blackburn v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 264 S.C. 535, 216
S.E.2d 192 (1975), in which the court applied a bad faith standard in holding the

insurer liable for a fraudulent breach of contract for accepting the insured's premium payments while knowing that the policy did not include catastrophes
against which the insured believed he was covered.
67 Note, Damages Assessed Against Insurers for Wrongful Failure to Pay, 10
WM. & MARy L. REv. 466, 472 (1968). See, e.g., Dawkins v. Nat'l Liberty Life Ins.
Co., 252 F. Supp 800 (D.S.C. 1966); Corley v. Coastal States Life Ins. Co., 244
S.C. 1, 135 S.E.2d 316 (1964).

IsNote, FORDHAM L. Rsv., supra note 20, at 173.
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Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
The majority of states permit a tort action for intentional infliction of emotional distress" and require proof of the following
elements in such an action: (1) outrageous conduct by the defendant; (2) the defendant's intentional causing of emotional distress
or his or her reckless disregard of the probability of causing such
distress; (3) severe or extreme mental distress suffered by the
plaintiff; and (4) actual or proximate causation of the plaintiff's
emotional distress by the defendant's conduct. 0
The states first recognizing this cause of action in the firstparty insurance context were California,7 Illinois,1 2 and Iowa1 3
Life and health insurers are particularly susceptible to an action
under this theory, since their policyholders at the time of making
claims are in emotion-charged situations. By combining a count
charging intentional infliction of emotional distress with a count
alleging a breach of the insurance contract, the insured may recover damages for mental distress plus the benefits due under the
contract and perhaps consequential damages.
There is sound authority to support the view that because of
the insurer's awareness of its policyholder's emotional vulnerability at the time a claim for loss is made, the insurer should be held
to a higher standard of care. The drafters of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts commented:
The extreme and outrageous character of the conduct may
arise from the actor's knowledge that the other is peculiarly
susceptible to the emotional distress, by reason of some physiU

See, e.g., United Services Auto. Ass'n v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 350 F. Supp.

869 (D. Conn. 1972); World Ins. Co. v. Wright, 308 So. 2d 612 (Fla. App. 1975);
Gibson v. Nat'l Ben Franklin Ins. Co., 387 A.2d 220 (Me. 1978); Harris v. Jones,
281 Md. 560, 380 A.2d 611 (1977); Frishett v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 3
Mich. App. 688, 143 N.W.2d 612 (1966); Rockhill v. Pollard, 259 Or. 54, 485 P.2d
28 (1971); Drake v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 70 Wis. 2d 977, 236 N.W.2d 204

(1975).
1, REsrATEum (SEcoND) or ToRTs § 46, at 71 (1965).

71 Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr.
78 (1970) (disability insurance policy).
"Eckenrode v. Life of America Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1972) (applying
Illinois law).
73Amsden v. Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co., 203 N.W.2d 252 (Iowa 1972), in
which the court discussed in dicta the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing in a first-party insurance contract.
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cal or mental condition or peculiarity. The conduct may become heartless, flagrant, and outrageous when the actor pro-

ceeds in the face of such knowledge, where it would not be so if
he did not know. 7'
This emotional vulnerability of the insurance claimant, coupled
with the quasi-public nature of the insurance industry and the insurer's control over the interests of the insured, requires a standard of insurer misconduct far short of "outrage" in determining
whether the insured should recover damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
In many states, however, the insured must prove that the insurer's conduct in refusing to pay his or her claim exceeded all
bounds usually tolerated by a decent society. 7 Additionally, the
insured must show that as a result he suffered severe mental distress. 76 Furthermore, the insurance company's settlement tactics
may be privileged, whereby it will not be held liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress if it merely insists upon its
legal rights in a permissible way. 77 The insured, therefore, faces a
heavy burden of proof in pursuing an action against his or her
insurer upon this theory.
West Virginia recognizes the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress. 78 A policyholder bringing an action for an insurer's refusal to pay a claim under this theory must prove that
his or her mental suffering resulted from the insurance company's
intentional or wanton wrongful act. 79 The plaintiff need not allege
that his or her emotional distress was severe, nor must the allega-

71RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 46, Comment f at 75 (1965).
7' Id., Comment d at 72 (1965).
7' Id., Comment j at 77 (1965), defines severe mental suffering to include "all
highly unpleasant mental reactions, such as fright, horror, grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment, worry, and nausea."
" RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF ToRTs § 46, Comment g and Illustration 14 at 76
(1965); Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 395-96, 89 Cal.
Rptr. 78, 89 (1970).
71 Prince v. Pittston Co., 63 F.R.D. 28 (S.D. W. Va. 1974); Harless v. First
Nat'l Bank in Fairmont, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978); England v. Central Pocahontas Coal Co., 86 W. Va. 575, 104 S.E. 46 (1920); Michaelson v. Turk, 79 W. Va.

31, 90 S.E. 395 (1916), applying W. VA. CODE § 55-7-2 (1966), the state's "insulting
words" statute.
" Monteleone v. Co-Operative Transit Co., 128 W. Va. 340, 346-47, 36 S.E.2d
475, 478 (1945).
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tions of mental suffering be corroborated by pecuniary losses."
The West Virginia plaintiff may recover punitive damages in
an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 8' However, by pursuing this type of suit the insured may be unable to
recover actual damages for loss of equity in property which resulted from the insurer's failure to pay a valid claim. If, for example, the insured loses his or her home due to inability to make
mortgage payments following the insurer's wrongful denial of the
disability policy claim, he or she may not be awarded compensation for such a loss under this theory of recovery.
Before the advent of the tort of bad faith refusal by an insurer to pay first-party claims, intentional infliction of emotional
distress was perhaps the most advantageous theory upon which to
bring suit against an insurer, for three reasons. First, the insured
need not prove any actual property or pecuniary loss to recover
damages for mental suffering. Second, most jurisdictions recognizing this cause of action permit recovery of punitive damages
against the insurance company. Third, once the insured establishes a prima facie case of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the insurer will have great difficulty in justifying its
conduct."2
Strict Liability
Several authors have commented that court decisions in various states have foreshadowed a rule of strict liability for an insurer's refusal to settle or pay a policyholder's claim.3 Most of the
cases cited for this proposition involve third-party (liability) insurance claims8" rather than first-party (indemnity) claims. Impo-

"State Human Rights Comm'n v. Pearlman Realty Agcy., 239 S.E.2d 145

(W.Va. 1977).
11Michaelson v. Turk, 79 W. Va. 31, 37, 90 S.E. 395, 397 (1916).

Note, First Party Torts-Extra-ContractualLiability of Insurers Who Violate the Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, 25 DRAKE L. RIv. 900, 914 (1976).
13 See Comment, The Emerging Fiduciary Obligations and Strict Liability in
Insurance Law, 14 CAL. W.L. Rxv. 358 (1978); Case Note, 12 CAL. W.L. Rev. 591
(1976); Hirsch & Carpenter, supra note 8.

" See Johansen v. California State Auto. Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bur., 15 Cal. 3d 9,
538 P.2d 744, 123 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1975); Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425,
426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967); Koppie v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 210 N.W.2d
844 (Iowa 1973); Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of America, 65 N.J.

474, 323 A.2d 495 (1974).
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sition of strict liability in the third-party insurance context may
be appropriate when the insurer has failed to negotiate properly a
settlement or defend its insured in court, thereby exposing its policyholder to a large judgment far,in excess of policy limits. However, no court has implemented such a rule thus far.
A few lower appellate court cases in California have been interpreted as indicating a trend toward strict liability in first-party
insurance." The supreme court of that state has made it clear,
however, that this is the era of bad faith." A rule of strict liability
should not be adopted in regard to first-party insurance, for this
would abrogate the insurer's right to investigate and reject invalid
claims. When debatable claims are submitted, the insurer has the
undeniable right to question their legitimacy. Imposition of strict
liability for all damages flowing from an insurance company's refusal to pay a claim, however spurious, would not properly balance the competing interests of insurer and insured in claims
disposition.

I. THE TORT OF BAD FAITH
The tort of bad faith evolved in California through a line of
decisions culminating in Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co.,"7 the
first case allowing recovery of compensatory and punitive damages based on an insurer's bad faith refusal to pay a first-party
claim. The elements that must be alleged and proven to establish
a prima facie case of bad faith include: (1) the insurer's duty of
good faith and fair dealing, (2) breach of that duty through (3)
bad faith conduct by the insurer, i.e., "the absence of a reasonable basis for denying benefits of the policy and the [insurer's]
knowledge or reckless disregard of the lack of a reasonable basis
for denying the claim,"I' and (4) damages resulting from the, insurer's bad faith conduct.
The duty upon which this tort is predicated arises in some
jurisdictions from an implied covenant of good faith and fair deal"Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 133 Cal. Rptr. 899 (1976); Jarchow v.
Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 48 Cal. App. 3d 917, 122 Cal. Rptr. 470 (1975).
w Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr.

480 (1973).
a

Id.

u Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 85 Wis. 2d 675, 691, 271 N.W.2d 368, 376
(1978).
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ing in the insurance contract.89 Other states' courts have construed statutes requiring an insurer to pay promptly the claims of
its policyholder as giving rise to such a duty." If the insurer
breaches this duty by acting in bad faith toward its insured, the
policyholder may bring a tort action in which he or she may recover compensatory damages for pecuniary loss and emotional
distress, plus, in the appropriate case, punitive damages.
The genesis of this cause of action began in 1958, when the
California court first applied the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing to an insurance contract.91 Nine years later, the
court reaffirmed the insurer's implied-in-law duty and established
a standard for the substantial damages recoverable for its breach
in a third-party insurance case. 2 In 1970 a lower appellate court
in California first discussed the independent tort of bad faith in
regard to first-party insurance claims in a case pleaded as an action for the separate tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. " The Supreme Court of California recognized the new cause
of action three years later in the Gruenberg decision.
The facts in Gruenberg were as follows: the plaintiff was the
owner of a cocktail lounge and restaurant which was destroyed in
a fire. The defendants were three insurance companies from which
the plaintiff had purchased fire policies. Following the blaze, the
insurers hired an investigation firm to evaluate the plaintiff's
claim. While at the burned-out restaurant, a claims adjuster for
this firm stated to an arson inspector from the Los Angeles Fire
Department that the plaintiff was overinsured.
Three days later criminal authorities charged the plaintiff
with the felony of arson. These charges were subsequently dismissed for lack of probable cause. In the interim, however, the
defendant insurance carriers retained a law firm to represent

"1

See, e.g., Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108

Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973).
"See, e.g., First Sec. Bank of Bozeman v. Goddard, 593 P.2d 1040 (Mont.
1979), construing MONT. Rsv. CoDEs ANN. § 40-4213 (1961) [now MONT. CODE ANN.

§ 33-21-105].
" Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958).
"

Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13

(1967).
11Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr.

78 (1970).
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them regarding the plaintiffs fire loss claim. A member of this
firm demanded in writing that the plaintiff appear at the firm's
office on a given date to produce certain documents and submit to
an examination under oath. Because the arson charges were still
pending at this time, his attorney advised the plaintiff not to
make any statements concerning the fire loss.
When the plaintiff failed to appear at the office of the defendants' attorneys on the specified date, the insurance companies denied liability on his claim on the ground that he had violated the
"notice and cooperation clause" in the fire insurance policies,
thus voiding the coverage thereunder. After the state dropped the
criminal charges against the plaintiff, his attorney advised the insurance carriers that the plaintiff was then willing to make himself available for an examination. The insurers reaffirmed their
denial of the claim because of the plaintiff's earlier failure to
appear.
The policyholder then filed a tort action against the insurance companies. The trial court dismissed the suit, and the plaintiff appealed. In his complaint, which did not include a count for
breach of contract, the insured alleged that as a "direct and proximate result of the outrageous conduct and bad faith of the defendants," he suffered "severe economic damages," "severe emotional upset and distress," loss of earnings, and sundry special
damages. The plaintiff sought punitive as well as compensatory
damages. The court held that while this complaint was "far from
a model pleading,""4 it did allege a breach of a duty owed by the
defendant insurance companies to their policyholder, the
plaintiff.95
In Gruenberg, the Supreme Court of California held that the
duty to accept reasonable settlements in a third-party insurance
case and the duty not to withhold unreasonably payments due
9 Cal. 3d 566, 575, 510 P.2d 1032, 1038, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 486 (1973).
,3 The insurance companies in Gruenberg sought to use the defense that their
performance under the fire policies was excused because of the plaintiff's supposed
breach of the contract for failure to comply with the cooperation clause in the
policies. In response to this contention the court declared, "[W]e do not think that
plaintiff's alleged breach excuses defendants from their duty, implied by law, of
good faith and fair dealing. In other words, thL insurer's duty is unconditional and
independent of the performance of the plaintiff's contractual obligations." 9 Cal.
3d at 578, 510 P.2d at 1040, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
"
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under a first-party policy are but two different aspects of the same
duty:
That responsibility is not the requirement mandated by
the terms of the policy itself-to defend, settle, or pay. It is the
obligation, deemed to be imposed by law, under which the insurer must act fairly and in good faith in discharging its contractual responsibilities. Where in so doing, it fails to deal
fairly and in good faith with its insured by refusing, without
proper cause, to compensate its insured for a loss covered by
the policy, such conduct may give rise to a cause of action in
tort for breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing."
The court further held that the insured could recover for emotional distress as an element of damages in a bad faith cause of
action, eliminating the requirement that the plaintiff's emotional
distress be "severe" in order to support such a damage award.
The Gruenberg court reasoned that since the plaintiff had suffered
substantial pecuniary losses aside from any emotional distress, he
was entitled to recover damages for mental suffering. 7 The court
did not address the issue of punitive damages since the jury had
not awarded such damages to the plaintiff.
The following year the tort of bad faith became firmly established in California with the decision in Silberg v. California Life
Insurance Company. 8 The plaintiff here had purchased a disability policy from the defendant insurer. The insured severely injured his foot while making an inspection of his landlord's laundromat, where he had agreed to perform incidental services in
return for a reduction in rent. Therefore, a question arose as to
whether his injury was covered by workmen's compensation and
thus expressly excluded from the coverage afforded by the insurance policy purchased from the defendant.
The insurance company refused to pay the plaintiff benefits
pending disposition of his workmen's compensation claim, contending that by doing so it was following an established practice
in the insurance industry. The insurer also defended its actions on
the ground that it genuinely believed the plaintiff's policy as written did not cover the foot injury.

* Id. at 573-74, 510 P.2d at 1037, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 485.
* Id. at 580, 510 P.2d at 1041-42, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 489-90.
," 11 Cal. 3d 452, 521 P.2d 1103, 113 Cal. Rptr. 711 (1974).
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The court rejected the defendant's arguments, holding that
the scope of an insurer's duty of good faith and fair dealing cannot
be circumscribed entirely by industry custom." The court found
that as a matter of law the insurance company had by its conduct
breached this duty owed to the plaintiff. Compensatory damages
of $75,000 were thus properly awarded for the resulting detriment
suffered by the insured, including his physical and mental
distress.
In Silberg the jury also awarded the plaintiff $500,000 in exemplary damages, and the recoverability of such damages was the
principal issue in the case on appeal. The state supreme court ordered the case remanded for another trial on the punitive damages issue. Applying a statutory provision, the court held that recovery of such damages required a showing of oppression, fraud,
or malice, with malice defined as "the intent to vex, injure or annoy, or with a conscious disregard of the plaintiff's rights."'' 0
Subsequent to these first bad faith case decisions in California, courts in at least fourteen other jurisdictions have expressly
recognized an independent tort for an insurer's breach of its duty
of good faith and fair dealing in handling first-party claims.' 1
Id. at 462, 521 P.2d at 1109, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 717.
®Id., 521 P.2d at 1110, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 718, applying CAL. Civ. CODE § 3294
(Deering 1972).
Several commentators have suggested that the Silberg holding represents a
setback to the insured by restricting exemplary damages recoverable in a bad faith
action against an insurer. See Hirsch & Carpenter, supra note 8, at 329, and Note,
DRAKE L. REv., supra note 82, at 911.
A more recent decision by a California lower appellate court belies that assumption, however. In Egan v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 133 Cal. Rptr. 899 (1976),
a fire insurance case, the lower court held that intent to harm is not a prerequisite
of bad faith conduct. The jury had awarded the plaintiff $123,000 in compensatory
damages and $5 million in punitive damages, which the appellate court reduced
by half on the ground that the huge exemplary damage award showed passion and
prejudice by the jury. Nevertheless, the court's decision to allow the plaintiff to
collect the remaining $2.5 million hardly suggests any serious restriction on the
insured's ability to recover punitive damages.
"I Battista v. Lebanon Trotting Ass'n, 538 F.2d 111 (6th Cir. 1976) (applying
Ohio law); Carter v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 423 F. Supp. 827 (E.D. Va.
1976); Escambia Treating Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 421 F. Supp. 1367
(N.D. Fla. 1976); United Services Auto. Ass'n v. Werley, 526 P.2d 28 (Alas. 1974);
Grand Sheet Metal Products Co. v. Protection Mut. Ins. Co., 34 Conn. Sup. 46,
375 A.2d 428 (1977); Ledingham v. Blue Cross Plan for Hosp. Care, 29 Ill. App. 3d
2d 338, 356 N.E.2d 76
339, 330 N.E.2d 540 (1975), rev'd on other grounds, 64 Ill.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol82/iss3/13

22

Gay: Tort of Insurer's Bad Faith Refusal to Pay First-Party Claims
1980]

INSURER'S REFUSAL TO PAY

Dicta in court opinions of several additional states have evinced a
favorable view toward this new cause of action,"' while only one
jurisdiction has rejected the new tort.n
While aggravated instances of insurer misconduct characterized the original California bad faith cases, states recently recognizing this new cause of action have permitted suits against insurance companies which engaged in more subtle forms of
wrongdoing. An example of this trend toward a more relaxed standard of what constitutes bad faith conduct by an insurer is Anderson v. Continental Insurance Co.,1" a 1978'decision by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin.
In 1973, the Andersons purchased a homeowner's policy from
the defendant insurance company which included coverage for
loss due to fire, lightning, explosion, or smoke. Two years later the
interior and contents of their home sustained smoke damage when
an oil furnace caught fire or exploded. The following day the
plaintiffs gave notice of the damage to the defendant insurer,
which hired an adjusting company to handle the claim. This company called in cleaners who attempted to renovate the premises
and contents of the policyholders' home. However, the plaintiffs
had to repaint the interior of the house and replace carpeting
which shrank due to the excessive cleaning ordered by the adjusting company.

(1976); Rex Ins. Co. v. Baldwin, 163 Ind. App. 308, 323 N.E.2d 270 (1975); First
Sec. Bank of Bozeman v. Goddard, 593 P.2d 1040 (Mont. 1979); United States
Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Peterson, 91 Nev.617, 540 P.2d 1070 (1975); State Farm
Gen. Ins. Co. v. Clifton, 86 N.M. 757, 527 P.2d 798 (1974); Corwin Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 279 N.W.2d 638 (N.D. 1979); Christian v.
American Home Assurance Co., 577 P.2d 899 (Okla. 1978); Diamon v. Penn Mut.
Fire Ins. Co., 247 Pa. Sup. 534, 372 A.2d 1218 (1977); Anderson v. Continental Ins.
Co,, 85 Wis. 2d 675, 271 N.W.2d 368 (1978).
InSee, e.g., Vincent v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Alabama, Inc., 373 So. 2d
1054 (Ala. 1979); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. McNeill, 27 Ariz. App. 502,
556 P.2d 803 (1976); Findley v. Time Ins. Co., 573 S.W.2d 908 (Ark. 1978); Dilorio
v. Abington Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 402 A.2d 745 (R.I. 1979).
" In Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Ins. Co., 118 N.H. 607, 392 A.2d 576
(1978), the Supreme Court of New Hampshire refused to recognize a tort action for
an insurer's bad faith in settling first-party claims. The court based its holding on
the ground that an insurer, while owing a duty of good faith and fair dealing to
liability policyholders in settling third-party claims against them, owes no such
duty to its first-party (indemnity) policyholders.
I- 85 Wis. 2d 675, 271 N.W.2d 368 (1978).
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The plaintiffs attempted unsuccessfully to negotiate with the
adjuster, as an agent of the defendant insurer, to be reimbursed
for these restoration costs. They then retained an attorney, who
immediately filed a proof of loss with the defendant insurance
company detailing the loss claimed by the policyholders. For
nearly two months the insurer and its agent, the adjusting company, shunted the plaintiffs' claim between their offices in Wisconsin and New York. The insurance company then returned the
proof of loss to the plaintiffs' counsel without paying the claim.
This prompted the policyholders to bring a court action against
their insurer on a theory of bad faith.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin held in Anderson that the
plaintiffs had stated a cause of action for bad faith, ' even though
the defendant insurer's alleged misconduct did not rise to the
level of wrongdoing displayed by the insurance company in
Gruenberg. As a quid pro quo for permitting a bad faith action
upon a lesser showing of insurer malfeasance, however, the Anderson decision set forth two rules restricting certain damages recoverable in a bad faith suit. The court held that a policyholder cannot recover damages for mental suffering inflicted by an insurer
unless his emotional distress is severe.' 0 Furthermore, the court
approved an award of punitive damages in a bad faith action only
upon "a showing of an evil intent deserving of punishment or of
something in the nature of special ill-will or wanton disregard of
duty or gross or outrageous conduct."' '
In addition to adopting a different set of damage rules applicable to a bad faith suit, the court in Anderson also departed
somewhat from the theory underlying this cause of action as it
was enunciated in the early California bad faith cases. The Wisconsin court clarified the distinction between the insurer's breach
of its contractual duty to its insured and breach of its duty of
good faith and fair dealing. The court criticized the use of the
label "tortious breach of contract,"'0 0 observing:
Id. at 684, 271 N.W.2d at 373.
Id. at 696, 271 N.W.2d at 378.
'0 Id. at 697, 271 N.W.2d at 379.
'' "Tortious breach of contract" is the term the Supreme Court of Mississippi
has chosen to denominate the tort action an insured may maintain for an insurer's
wrongful failure to pay a first-party claim. In Travelers Indem. Co. v. Wetherbee,
368 So. 2d 829 (Miss. 1979), the court recognized an independent tort for the insurer's intentional withholding of benefits due under a fire insurance policy and
lO

10
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While that term may be a convenient shorthand method of denominating the intentional conduct of a contracting party
when it acts in bad faith to avoid its contract obligations, it is
confusing and inappropriate, because it could lead one to believe that the wrong done is the breach of the contract. It obscures the fact that bad faith conduct by one party to a contract toward another is a tort separate and apart from a breach
of contract per se and it fails to emphasize the fact that separate damages may be recovered for the tort and for the contract breach."I
This distinction is especially significant in regard to the recovery of punitive damages, which are generally not awarded for a
breach of contract. The question of whether exemplary damages
are recoverable in a bad faith action cannot be disposed of upon
the assertion by the insurer that the insured is alleging a breach
of contract. Instead the punitive damages issue must be considered in light of "whether the facts surrounding the tort of bad
faith evidence such conduct that punitive or exemplary damages
are permissible."'' 0
Two types of standards are used in determining whether an
insurer has acted in bad faith toward its insured. Some courts apply an objective test based on whether a reasonable insurance
company in like or similar circumstances would have denied the
claim."' Other jurisdictions adopt a dual standard: an objective
test of whether a reasonable insurer would engage in such conduct, and a subjective test of whether the particular insurance
company knew or reasonably should have known that its conduct
2
would result in harm to its insured.1
In applying the objective standard for determining whether
the insurer has acted in bad faith, the court must consider
whether the insurance company properly investigated the policyholder's claim and afforded the results of that investigation a reasonable evaluation and review."' Guidelines on what constitutes

approved an award of punitive damages.
'" 85 Wis. 2d at 686, 271 N.W.2d at 374 (emphasis added).
"' Id. at 687, 271 N.W.2d at 374.
" See, e.g., Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 85 Wis. 2d 675, 271 N.W.2d 368
(1978).
"I See, e.g., Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89
Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970).
"1 85 Wis. 2d at 692, 271 N.W.2d at 377.
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reasonable investigative and claims handling techniques by insurance companies may be found in unfair claims practices or unfair
trade practices statutes enacted in many states. "Juries should
have no more difficulty in recognizing the bad faith insurer than
in recognizing the reasonably prudent person in negligence
actions.""'
For a policyholder whose first-party claim has been wrongfully denied, bringing a bad faith action against his or her insurer
has several advantages over other tort theories. Unlike a fraud action, a bad faith suit does not require a showing of fraud in the
inducement to enter the insurance contract. An action for breach
of the insurer's duty of good faith and fair dealing embraces the
theory of fraud"' while permitting recovery upon proof of the insurer's wrongdoing at the time a claim is made and unreasonably
denied. Furthermore, mental distress is only one element of damages sought in a bad faith suit, rather than being the basis of the
tort as with an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. In many jurisdictions, except Wisconsin, the plaintiff may
be compensated for mental anguish without showing that his or
her emotional distress was severe or that the insurer's conduct
was outrageous."'
The most controversial aspect of the tort of bad faith is the
recovery of large punitive damage awards allowed by many state
courts which recognize this cause of action. Due to the vast
financial resources of insurance, companies, exemplary damage
awards against these entities must necessarily be large in order to
punish an insurer sufficiently for its wrongdoing."17 It is an established rule in many jurisdictions that the jury may consider the
pecuniary condition of a defendant in determining the amount of
punitive damages necessary for his adequate punishment."'
"'

Note, FoRDHAM L. Rnv., supra note 20, at 180.

1,5In Escambia Treating Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 421 F. Supp. 1367

(N.D. Fla. 1976), for example, the court held that while the facts of the case did
not support a fraud claim, the plaintiff did state a cause of action for bad faith
against the defendant insurer.
" Note, FOeRDHAM L. REv., supra note 20, at 180.
"7 See, e.g., Standard Life Ins. Co. of Indiana v. Veal, 354 So. 2d 239 (Miss.
1977), in which the court upheld a $25,000 punitive damage award against an insurance company with assets in excess of $85 million which had denied a legitimate claim with no reason.
"I See, e.g., Hess v. Marinari, 81 W. Va. 500, 94 S.E. 968 (1918).
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As a deterrent to abusive tactics used by insurers in delaying
or denying payment of valid claims, an award of exemplary damages is the only viable remedy. The threat of its policyholder collecting high punitive damages in a bad faith action should discourage an insurer from employing groundless excuses in an
attempt to escape liability for payments due under an insurance
contract.
Obviously, courts should not award punitive damages so as to
infringe upon the insurer's right to disagree with the claimant as
to the amount of benefits due under a policy. The judiciary must
take care not to dissuade insurers from adjudicating honest disputes over claims, even if the insurer is in error and the litigation
harms the opposing party. An insurance company should not be
exposed to an award of exemplary damages for attempting in good
faith to pay only the amounts required under the provisions of a
policy.
It has been argued that insurance companies which must pay
huge sums as punitive damages will pass this cost along to the
public in the form of higher premiums. If this in fact occurs, punishment and deterrence of the insurer's wrongdoing will not be
achieved. However, exemplary damages may still serve a valuable
function. Insurers who act fairly and in good faith in handling
claims will not have to pay large punitive damage awards. These
companies may thus have larger profit margins, which will encourage insurers to avoid bad faith conduct giving rise to exemplary damage awards."' An insurance company's management
personnel are responsible to directors and shareholders, who will
not tolerate practices which result in high punitive damages being
assessed against the company.
In addition to criticism that the tort of bad faith promotes
runaway exemplary damage awards, opponents of this cause of
action have contended that recognition of this tort forces insurers
to "pay all claims and investigate afterwards, assuming, of course,
payment doesn't waive that right.""1 ' This eventuality has not occurred, however, in jurisdictions allowing actions for an insurer's
bad faith. Courts in these states have upheld, for example, the

"'

Comment, 15 SAN DiEco L. Rv. 287, 307 (1978).

v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 592, 510 P.2d 1032, 1049, 108
Cal. Rptr. 480, 497 (1973) (dissenting opinion).
SGruenberg
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insurer's right (albeit duty) to thoroughly investigate a claim''
and to seek a declaratory judgment on whether it is liable for paying a disputed claim.'1 One court has held that an insurance company which denied a claim in the mistaken belief that it was not
covered by the policy was liable only for the policy benefits plus
interest.12
Conversely, the insurer should have no right to rely on
groundless defenses in denying a valid claim,'24 to evade its statutory duty of making payments as soon as possible,12 or to file a
criminal charge against a policyholder for attempting to cheat the
insurance company without first investigating the insured's
claim.'28 Adoption of a tort cause of action for bad faith most adequately recompenses a policyholder who has been the victim of
such tactics.

IV.

REcOGNITION OF THE TORT OF BAD FAITH IN WEST VIRGINIA

The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has never been
presented with a first-party insurance case brought on the tort
theory of bad faith.'1 In Speicher v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,'12 the court was faced with deciding whether
an insurer owes a duty of due care or good faith to its liability
policyholder in negotiating pre-trial settlements of third-party
"I

See, e.g., Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 85 Wis. 2d 675, 271 N.W.2d 368

(1978).
"I See, e.g., State Farm Gen. Ins. Co. v. Clifton, 86 N.M. 757, 527 P.2d 798
(1974); Christian v. American Home Assur. Co., 577 P.2d 899 (Okla. 1978).
"I Ledingham v. Blue Cross Plan for Hosp. Care, 29 l. App. 3d 339, 330
N.E.2d 540 (1975), rev'd on other grounds, 64 Ill.
2d 338, 356 N.E.2d 75 (1976).
I" See United Services Auto. Ass'n v. Werley, 526 P.2d 28 (Alaska 1974).
125See First Sec. Bank of Bozeman v. Goddard, 593 P.2d 1040 (Mont. 1979).
1-4
See Diamon v. Penn Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 247 Pa. Super. 534, 372 A.2d 1218
(1977).
I" If such a suit were filed in a trial court in West Virginia, enabling statutes
would permit the question whether the tort of bad faith is recognized in West Virginia to be certified to the state supreme court of appeals. Under W. VA. CoDE §
58-5-2 (Cum. Supp. 1979), a circuit court could certify this question to the supreme court if, for example, the defendant challenged the sufficiency of the complaint or moved for judgment on the pleadings. If a bad faith action involving
first-party insurance were brought in a federal district court in West Virginia,
under W. VA. CooE § 51-1A-1 (Cum. Supp. 1979) the court could certify the question to the state supreme court of appeals due to a lack of controlling precedent on
the issue in this jurisdiction.
1- 151 W. Va. 292, 151 S.E.2d 684 (1966).
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claims against its insured. Here the court held that it need not
reach the issue of the duty owed by the insurer, since upon the
facts of the case the defendant insurer had acted neither negligently nor in bad faith. 2 ' The insurance company had thoroughly
investigated the claims against the plaintiff-insured and had
made several reasonable settlement offers to the third-party
claimants, who insisted on pursuing the case to trial. The Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals subsequently held that under West Virginia law, an insurer owes a combined duty of good faith and due
care in disposing of third-party claims.13 °
In Speicher, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals did
not reject the premise that a duty of good faith exists in the context of third-party insurance claims. It held only that the facts of
that case showed no lack of good faith or due care by the defendant insurer. The Speicher decision therefore presents no obstacle
to the court's future recognition of the insurer's duty of good faith
and fair dealing in the first-party context, the breach of which
would give rise to a tort cause of action.
Support for awarding extracontractual damages against insurers who wrongfully delay policy benefit payments can be found
in Justice Neely's concurring opinion in Jarrett v. E. L. Harper&
Son, Inc.,' 9 a 1977 case involving destruction of the plaintiffs'
water well due to the defendant's negligence. The court held in
Jarrett that annoyance and inconvenience are proper elements of
damages recoverable for injury to real property. ' In his concurrence Justice Neely stated that this rule probably also applies as
well to damages for injury to personalty. He then advocated a policyholder's recovery of damages for annoyance and inconvenience
against automobile insurers who fail to settle claims quickly in
reliance upon the proposition that insureds cannot realistically
sue them for property damage. Justice Neely also cited fire insurance companies, which frequently deny the claims of their own
policyholders, as appropriate targets for extracontractual damage
'
awards if they deny or delay payment of legitimate claims. 33

Id. at 301, 151 S.E.2d at 689.
"

Daniels v. Horace Mann Mut. Ins. Co., 422 F.2d 87 (4th Cir. 1970) (apply-

ing West Virginia law).
131235 S.E.2d 362 (W. Va. 1977).

,"2 Id. at 366.
123 Id.
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Bad faith is an intentional tort which must be proven on the
basis of affirmative acts of the insurer amounting to a breach of
its duty of good faith and fair dealing. If this cause of action is
recognized in West Virginia, punitive damages may be recovered
in a bad faith suit,"' with the requirement that such damages
may be awarded only in addition to compensatory or actual
damages.'u
In West Virginia an award of punitive damages may be in an
amount as will be sufficient, together with the compensatory damages awarded against him or her, to punish the defendant for his
or her wrongdoing and discourage others from committing similar
offenses.'36 The jury may consider the station of the parties and
the financial condition of the defendant in determining what will
be an adequate award of exemplary damages.'37
These rules could result in large damage verdicts being returned against insurers if the tort of bad faith were recognized in
this state. However, the possible threat of huge punitive damages
being awarded against insurance companies is weakened by the
West Virginia rule that exemplary damages, if awarded, must
bear some reasonable proportion to compensatory damages." 8 The
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has never precisely defined what is such a "reasonable proportion." It apparently is a
standard somewhere between a two-to-one ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages 3 ' and a ten-to-one ratio."'

'I See generally Addair v. Huffman, 156 W. Va. 592, 195 S.E.2d 739 (1973);
Horn v. Bowen, 136 W. Va. 465, 67 S.E.2d 737 (1951); Hurxthal v. St. Lawrence
Boom & Lumber Co., 53 W. Va. 87, 44 S.E. 520 (1903).
'" Spencer v. Steinbrecher, 152 W. Va. 490, 164 S.E.2d 710 (1968).
I' Ennis v. Brawley, 129 W. Va. 621, 41 S.E.2d 680 (1947); Peck v. Bez, 129
W. Va. 247, 40 S.E.2d 1 (1946); McCoy v. Price, 91 W. Va. 10, 112 S.E. 186 (1922).
,"7 Pendleton v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 82 W. Va. 270, 95 S.E. 941 (1918);
Hess v. Marinari, 81 W. Va. 500, 94 S.E. 968 (1918).
In Addair v. Huffman, 156 W. Va. 592, 195 S.E.2d 739 (1973); Spencer v.
Steinbrecher, 152 W. Va. 490, 164 S.E.2d 710 (1968); Toler v. Cassinelli, 129 W.
Va. 591, 41 S.E.2d 672 (1946); Newman v. Robson & Prichard, 86 W. Va. 681, 104
S.E. 127 (1920); Hess v. Marinari, 81 W. Va. 500, 94 S.E. 968 (1918).
In Turk v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 75 W. Va. 623, 84 S.E. 569 (1915), holding
that the facts of the case, a wrongful death action, justified an award of $500 compensatory and $1,000 punitive damages.
,"' Pendleton v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 82 W. Va. 270, 95 S.E. 941 (1918),
holding that an award of $557.50 compensatory damages and $5,000 punitive damages was not reasonably proportional.
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The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has shown a
liberal bent toward consumer protection in recent decisions."' It
seems safe to predict that the court, if presented with an opportunity to recognize the new cause of action, would be willing to follow the California rule and adopt the tort of bad faith for the benefit of the insured public.
V.

CONCLUSION

A policyholder purchases insurance coverage to obtain both
financial security and peace of mind. The insured pays premiums
in the expectation that if he or she suffers a loss covered by his or
her policy, the insurance company will act promptly to investigate
and pay his or her claim. If the insurer wrongfully denies or delays
payment of a valid claim, its actions may severely endanger the
policyholder's economic and emotional well-being.
Existing judicial and statutory remedies in many jurisdictions are inadequate to prevent abusive practices by insurance
companies or to compensate an insured who has suffered harm
because he or she was not paid the policy benefits which were
due. Mere contractual damages, even in states permitting the policyholder to recover for some of the consequential harm resulting
from an insurer's misconduct, are clearly insufficient to compensate the insured fully. While actions for fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress are often available to an injured policyholder, these bases of recovery cast a heavy burden of proof on
the insured to show a heightened form of wrongdoing by the insurer before he or she can collect damages. The more subtle forms
of insurance company misconduct, which nonetheless deny the insured the protection he or she has paid for, may not be redressed
by these remedies.
The judiciary must take into account the interests of the insurance industry, the individual, and society in resolving this
problem. The most appropriate solution is recognition of the tort

",

For example, in Teller v. McCoy, 253 S.E.2d 114 (W. Va. 1978), the court

held that every residential lease contains an implied warranty of habitability, thus
holding landlords legally liable for failure to maintain safe, fit rental housing
units. Additionally, the court in Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 253
S.E.2d 666 (W.Va. 1979) adopted the rule of Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,
Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963), imposing strict liability
for defective products.
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of an insurer's bad faith refusal to pay legitimate first-paity
claims. The theory underlying this cause of action does not
abridge an insurance company's right to investigate and deny
fraudulent claims or those excluded from policy coverage. If the
insurer does not act fairly and in good faith, however, the policyholder who is harmed as a result can be most adequately compensated by using a bad faith theory of action.
As initially noted in this article, the current status of the law
in many states encourages an insurer to delay unreasonably and
unfairly payment of its policyholder's claim.
[T]he consumer is generally entitled to protection, and particularly to receive from his insurance company whatever he reasonably thought he was buying. . . . [The protection the law
affords must be realistic.
[The insured] doesn't really get
what he reasonably expected if [policy benefits are paid] only
after years of battling the inarguably superior resources of the
company, deducting sometimes-monstrous contingent fees and
always-irksome costs, and frequently weathering a plentitude
of abuse and harrassment in the bargain.
.. . The company has everything to gain by fighting The

Bad Fight and nothing to lose but interest on its just
obligation."'
Recognition of the tort of bad faith best remedies this inequity. Successful litigation of bad faith actions will bring insurers'
abuses to the attention of the courts, the legislatures, and the
public, thereby destroying the climate in which such wrongdoing
may now flourish.'
Linda Gay

2 Lascher, The Imposition of Punitive Damages in the Enforcement of Insurance Contracts, 1971 ABA PROCEDINoS, ABA SECTION OF INSURANCE, NEGLIGENCE
AND COMPENSATION LAw 220, 220-21.
10 Shemoff & Blickenstaff, Investigatingfor Bad Faith:The Role of Plaintiff's
Attorney, 14 FORUM 132, 141 (1978).
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